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ABSTRACT
Switzerland has a long tradition of direct democracy, which
makes it an ideal laboratory for research on real-world poli-
tics. Similar to recent open government initiatives launched
worldwide, the Swiss government regularly releases datasets
related to state affairs and politics. In this paper, we propose
an exploratory, data-driven study of the political landscape
of Switzerland, in which we use opinions expressed by can-
didates and citizens on a web platform during the recent
Swiss parliamentary elections, together with fine-grained vote
results and parliament votes.
Following this purely data-driven approach, we show that
it is possible to uncover interesting patterns that would oth-
erwise require both tedious manual analysis and domain
knowledge. In particular, we show that traditional cultural
and/or ideological idiosyncrasies can be highlighted and quan-
tified by looking at vote results and pre-election opinions. We
propose a technique for comparing the candidates’ opinions
expressed before the elections with their actual votes cast
in the parliament after the elections. This technique spots
politicians that do not vote consistently with the opinions
that they expressed during the campaign. We also observe
that it is possible to predict surprisingly precisely the out-
come of nationwide votes, by looking at the outcome in a
single, carefully selected municipality. Our work applies to
any country where similar data is available; it points to some
of the avenues created by user-generated data emerging from
open government initiatives, which enable new data-mining
approaches to political and social sciences.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Applications]: Data Mining
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1. INTRODUCTION
In order to promote transparency and accountability, as
well as to stimulate citizen awareness, an increasing number
of governments across the world are adopting open govern-
ment directives [20]. As of 2014, the website Datacatalogs [1]
references more than 350 such local, regional and national
datasets. These initiatives result in the release of massive
amounts of structured data about multiple aspects of state
affairs, politics, and governmental agencies in various coun-
tries.
In parallel to these efforts, several governments, organiza-
tions and academic groups set up voting advice applications
(VAA’s) in the form of websites that allow politicians and
interested citizens to express their preferences on political
issues, by answering a series of pre-determined questions
spanning a variety of topics. The candidates have public
profiles containing their responses (as well as various other
information, such as their birthdate, interests, or Facebook
profile), and the voters are matched with candidates based on
their own responses. Examples of such VAA’s include Vote
Compass [6] in Canada, the USA and Australia, Stemwi-
jzer [5] in the Netherlands, Wahl-O-Mat [7] in Germany,
Stemtest [4] in Belgium and smartvote [3] in Switzerland.
In this paper, we propose an exploratory, data-mining ap-
proach that uses some of the data released by governments,
together with data obtained from VAA’s, to analyze a coun-
try’s democracy and political trends. We consider the case
of Switzerland: This country has a diversified party land-
scape, with frequent votes on a wide variety of topics, both
at parliamentary and citizen levels. We use three different
datasets:
1. The set of all vote results in each municipality, for each
national vote between 1981 and 2011.
2. The set of all votes in the parliament, by all parliament
members, during the current legislature (which started
in 2011).
3. The set of opinions given on the smartvote VAA [3] by
hundreds of thousands of citizens, as well as more than
82% of candidates for parliamentary elections.
We give more details on our datasets in Section 2.2. The
initial reason for the existence of these datasets was to in-
crease government accountability and citizen participation.
abbreviation full name ideology obtained votes
SVP Swiss People’s Party National conservatism 26.6%
SP Social Democratic Party Social democracy 18.7%
FDP Free Democratic Party Classical liberalism 15.1%
CVP Christian Democratic People’s Party Christian democracy 12.3%
Greens Green Party Green politics 8.4%
BDP Conservative Democratic Party Conservatism, economic liberalism 5.4%
GL Green Liberal Party Green liberalism 5.4%
Table 1: The seven major parties after the Swiss National Council elections of 2011. The last column lists
the percentage of votes each party obtained during these elections.
Yet, as a byproduct, they also provide researchers with new
ways of mining and (re-)discovering patterns that are pecu-
liar to political life, but that usually require tedious manual
analysis and domain knowledge. Although the nature of
this data (e.g., the individual opinions of politicians or votes
in municipalities) is not new, its scale is unprecedented. It
enables us to address interesting questions such as
• What are the similarities between the ideological trends
of parliament candidates (the representatives) and vot-
ers?
• Considering all votes at the municipality level over a
period of 30 years, are there some clear patterns linking
geography and voting behaviors?
• Is it possible to predict nationwide vote outcomes by
looking only at the outcome in a single municipality?
• How “redundant” are political parties, given the opin-
ions expressed by their candidates in smartvote sur-
veys?
• How should a candidate fill a VAA survey during the
campaign, in order to maximize her likelihood to appear
at the top of the voting recommendations?
• In order to hold a candidate accountable for her public
statements, can we use the survey she filled out during
the election campaign, once she has been elected at the
parliament?
Our intent is to exploit the scale of the data to tackle these
questions from a statistical perspective. Of course, our results
are not universal, and they are valid only in the contexts for
which our datasets are representative. Yet, our various pro-
cedures apply to any context where similar data is available,
and our main intent in this paper is to show how system-
atic data mining can shed new light on questions related to
political and social sciences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we give some background information on Swiss
politics and the datasets we use. In Section 3, we study the
ideological landscape and the differences between parliament
candidates and voters. In Section 4, we study trends at a
geographical level and observe to what extent vote results
of individual municipalities can be used to predict national
vote outcomes. In Section 5, we show that voting advice
applications can be abused by candidates to obtain better
ranks in voting recommendations. We also propose a tech-
nique to use these same VAA surveys in order to check on
the consistency of the votes at the parliament. Finally, we
discuss some related work in Section 6, and we give some
concluding remarks in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly describe the Swiss political sys-
tem, and its various components. We list the main politi-
cal parties on which we focus, and then describe the three
datasets we use in this paper. The first dataset contains vote
outcomes at the municipality level, the second consists of
votes of the members of the parliament, and the last dataset
contains political opinions of candidates and voters, gathered
on an online voting advice application.
2.1 Politics of Switzerland
The political system of Switzerland consists of a Federal
Council (7 seats) and a bicameral parliament, which is com-
posed of the Council of States (46 seats) and the National
Council (200 seats). The Federal Council serves as head of
state and executive power, and the parliament possesses the
legislative power (together with citizens, as per the constitu-
tional right for citizens to launch initiatives1). The Council
of States represents the cantons (which are the states of the
federal state), and each canton is attributed two seats (except
six “half” cantons that have only one seat). The National
Council represents the people, and each canton is attributed
a number of seats proportional to its population.
The National Council and the Council of States are elected
at the same time every four years, most recently in 2011.
Several political parties are represented in the parliament.
In this paper, we focus on the seven largest parties (in terms
of votes obtained during the National Council elections in
2011) shown on Table 1.
2.2 Description of the Datasets
In this section, we describe the three datasets that we use
for our analysis. We provide a summary in Table 2.
2.2.1 Municipality Votes
Our first dataset consists of the outcomes of the federal (i.e.,
nationwide) votes for each municipality between January 1981
and December 2011. There were 245 such votes on various
topics, including military, finances, transportation, culture,
integration of foreigners, public health, education, equality of
rights, working conditions, energy policies, abortion, etc. The
results (i.e., the proportions of “yes”) are publicly available
for each Swiss municipality2. In December 2011, there were
2,515 municipalities in Switzerland. We discard the results
1Initiatives, similar to propositions in California, allow any
citizen or organization to gather a predetermined number of
signatures to propose a new piece of legislation [36].
2http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/
themen/17/03/blank/data/01.html
dataset content
Municipality
votes
Outcomes (percentage of “yes”) for 245
nationwide votes in 2,389 municipal-
ities between 1981 and 2011. This
amounts to 585,305 outcomes.
Votes in the
parliament
2,494 votes (yes/no/abstention) by 181
of the 200 national councilors, since the
beginning of the current legislature in
2011. This amounts to 451,414 votes.
Smartvote
pre-electoral
opinions
Responses given by 2,985 candidates
(82.4% of all candidates) and 229,133
citizens (∼9% of total turnout) on the
smartvote VAA [3] during the cam-
paign of the 2011 parliamentary elec-
tions.
Table 2: Specifications of our three datasets.
smartvote 2011 statistics
Number of questions in the short survey 32
Number of questions in the long survey 75
Number of candidates who took the long survey 2985
Approximate number of unique voters that re-
quested recommendations
436,726
Number of voters who completed all questions
of the short survey
229,133
Number of voters who completed all questions
of the long survey
80,067
Table 3: Statistics about the political opinions
dataset, that contains the responses given on the
smartvote VAA by the citizens and candidates dur-
ing the Swiss parliamentary elections of 2011.
for all the municipalities that have merged during the period
1981-2011, and our final dataset contains the vote results for
2,389 municipalities.
2.2.2 Votes in the Parliament
Our second dataset consists of all the votes of the members
of the National Council since the beginning of the current leg-
islature, between December 2011 and December 2013. There
were 2,494 votes by the 200 national councilors during this
period3. In order to compare the opinions given on smartvote
with the votes in the National Council, we discard the votes
of the councilors that did not reply to the smartvote survey,
hence our final dataset contains the votes (or abstentions) of
181 national councilors.
2.2.3 Opinions Expressed on Smartvote
Our third dataset consists of the responses given on the
smartvote VAA [3] by the citizens and candidates during the
Swiss parliamentary elections of 20114. Smartvote proposes
a long and a short survey. The short survey is composed of
32 questions and the long survey is composed of 75 questions,
that include the 32 questions from the short survey. The
3The data is publicly available via a dedicated web-service:
http://ws.parlament.ch/votes.
4The smartvote dataset can be obtained on demand for re-
search purposes, by sending a request to contact@smartvote.
ch.
voters (i.e., the visitors of the website) had the freedom to
choose which survey to answer, but the candidates had to
answer all the questions of the long survey. The questions
address various topics ranging from society to economy and
finance, and they were carefully selected to cover topics as
representative as possible of current political issues. An
answer consists in selecting one of the following options:
strongly agree - agree - disagree - strongly disagree. An
additional set of “budget questions” require selecting one of
the options: less - no change - more. Finally, the voters
can also select “no answer” (an option not available to the
candidates). Each possible answer is mapped internally by
smartvote to a number in the set {0, 0.25, 0.75, 1} for regular
questions, and in the set {0, 0.5, 1} for budget questions.
The final recommendation given to each voter is a list of
candidates, in decreasing order of distance (using the l2-norm)
to this voter [32].
2,985 candidates filled out the survey, which represents
about 82.4% of all the candidates. Unless otherwise specified,
we consider the responses given by voters who participated
in the short survey (which was the most popular survey).
This amounts to about 229,000 voters5, which corresponds
to 9.3% of the total voter turnout of 2011. Detailed statistics
about this dataset are summarized in Table 3.
3. IDEOLOGICAL SPACE
In this section, we provide a first analysis of the po-
litical landscape of Switzerland. We observe that simple
dimensionality-reduction techniques can produce useful vi-
sual representations of political positions. We then analyze
the difference of distribution and polarization between voters
and candidates (before and after the elections), in such politi-
cal spaces. Finally, we compute pairwise similarities between
political parties, as measured by the opinions expressed by
their members.
3.1 Dimensionality Reduction
In this section, we consider the dataset of opinions ex-
pressed on smartvote. Each candidate who took the short
survey can be represented as a point in a space of 32 dimen-
sions. Because it is likely that some politicians tend to think
similarly on several questions, we can expect that some of
these dimensions are strongly correlated. For instance, it
could be the case that two persons who answer similarly to
the question “Should access to naturalization be made more
difficult?” also answer similarly to the question “Are you in
favor of legalizing the status of illegal immigrants?”. There-
fore, one of the first questions that we could ask concerns
the intrinsic dimensionality of this dataset. In the following,
we use principal component analysis (PCA) [28, 30] in order
to compute the sets of questions that best capture these
correlations.
Denote by A the set of possible responses to any question
on smartvote6. Let n be the number of questions and C
the number of candidates. Using this notation, we define C
as the C × n matrix of candidates’ responses, whose (i, j)th
entry Ci,j ∈ A is the response of the i-th candidate to the
5Note that obtaining a precise figure for the number of unique
voters is difficult, as one voter can ask several recommenda-
tions on the website. This number is an estimate, obtained
after filtering out identical web sessions.
6We merge budget and regular questions, and take A =
{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} for all questions.
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Figure 1: Left: 2-D projection of candidates onto the first two singular vectors of the matrix of their
smartvote responses. Right: projection obtained by the smartvote Smartmap, with qualitative axes referring
to traditional ideological separations.
j-th question. We start by centering C so that it has zero
mean. We then compute the SVD factorization of C as
C = UΣWT ,
where U is the C × C matrix whose columns are the left-
singular vectors of C, Σ is a C × n diagonal matrix, whose
n non-zero entries are given by the singular values of C, and
W is the n× n matrix whose columns are the right-singular
vectors of C. We adopt the usual convention, according to
which the columns of U and W, and the diagonal elements of
Σ are ordered by decreasing amplitude of the corresponding
singular values. The projection of C onto the basis consti-
tuted by its singular vectors is given by C′ := CW. The
matrix C′ has a diagonal covariance matrix, i.e., all its di-
mensions are uncorrelated. Furthermore, if we denote si
the singular value associated with the i-th singular vector,
the variance of the data along the i-th dimension of C′ is
proportional to s2i . It follows that, for any k ≤ n, the first k
dimensions of C′ are the k dimensions that capture most of
the variance of the data.
We use this property in Figure 1 (left) to obtain a graphical
representation of the candidates on the plane, by showing the
first two columns of C′, i.e., the projection of C onto its first
two singular vectors. In Figure 1 (right), we also show the
representation of the same candidates using the Smartmap
provided by smartvote [3]. The Smartmap employs a similar
dimensionality-reduction technique based on correspondence
analysis, and it has been manually validated in order to
obtain the correspondence with traditional left/right and
liberal/conservative directions.
The relative positions of candidates and political parties
are qualitatively similar in both cases, which confirms that
our dimensionality-reduction approach is consistent with
traditional ideological representations.
Interestingly, PCA easily recovers the usual left/right and
liberal/conservative divisions, by looking only at the re-
sponses (and not at the questions themselves). In Table 4,
Singular
vector
First two questions
1st 1. Would you support foreigners who have
lived for at least ten years in Switzerland
being given voting and electoral rights at
municipal level?
2. Are you in favour of legalizing the status
of illegal immigrants?
2nd 1. Are you in favour of the complete liberal-
ization of shop opening times?
2. Should Switzerland conclude an agricul-
tural free trade agreement with the EU?
3rd 1. Should Switzerland legalize the consump-
tion of hard and soft drugs?
2. Should same-sex couples who have regis-
tered their partnership be able to adopt
children?
Table 4: Two most important questions of the first
three singular vectors, for the dataset of candidates’
responses to the smartvote survey. These questions
are those that contribute the most, in absolute value,
to each of the singular vectors. They can be used
to interpret the different themes on which the can-
didates tend to disagree the most.
we show the two most important questions corresponding to
the first three singular vectors (i.e., the two questions with
the largest absolute weights for each axis). It very clearly
appears that the first two axes refer, broadly speaking, to
openness and integration of foreigners, and to economic lib-
eralism. Interestingly, the third axis (not used for the 2-D
representation in Figure 1) seems dominated by “ethical” is-
sues, such as drug consumption and adoption by same-sex
couples.
Candidate density
Voter density
Figure 2: Density of candidates and voters in the
ideological space, computed from their smartvote re-
sponses. The distributions are very different, and
the candidates at the “left” of the space exhibit es-
pecially low variance.
3.2 Candidates, Voters, and Polarization
Using the dimensionality-reduction approach presented
in the previous section, we can compare the distribution of
candidates with that of voters in the ideological space. To this
end, we divide the 2-D region of Figure 1 in a 30×30 grid and
compute the candidate density as the number of candidates
falling into each cell. We follow the same procedure for
voters and show both densities in Figure 2. Perhaps the
most striking feature of this figure is the comparatively large
density of candidates residing on the “left” of the political
space. As has already been observed [13], left-wing candidates
appear to be very consistent in their responses and exhibit
little variance. It seems to be that these candidates, more
than the others, tend to strongly agree on the issues raised
in the first two singular vectors. It is also possible that
this is partly an artifact due to the (publicly admitted [17])
existence of “guidelines” provided by some parties and used
by their candidates to answer smartvote questions.
The difference between the two densities of Figure 2 also
suggests that politicians are somewhat more polarized than
Figure 3: 2-D representation of parliament mem-
bers, obtained from the dataset of votes in the par-
liament. The votes in the parliament are more clus-
tered and polarized than the pre-electoral opinions
given by candidates and represented in Figure 1.
citizens. This fact has often been observed by political
scientists, in particular in Switzerland [21]. It is confirmed
by the first two plots in Figure 4 that show the proportion
of total variance that is captured by each of the first three
singular vectors (as well as the remaining variance, captured
by the remaining singular vectors). We see that the first
three singular vectors capture about a third of the variance
in the voters responses, while candidates have 58% of their
variance captured in these first three dimensions.
To further investigate the polarization of politicians, we
apply the same dimensionality-reduction approach to the
dataset of parliament votes. The resulting 2-D representation
of the members of the parliament is shown in Figure 3.
Once elected, politicians are much more clustered (which
is essentially explained by the existence of coalitions in the
parliament). We also show in the last plot of Figure 4 the
variance captured by the singular vectors of the dataset of the
parliament votes. It confirms that votes in the parliament are
strongly polarized, with 66% of the total variance explained
by only the first three axes. The candidates, in contrast, are
somewhat less polarized during the pre-electoral campaign,
but still significantly more than the voters.
3.2.1 Party Overlaps
Figure 1 shows that some subsets of the political parties sig-
nificantly overlap with each other. In order to check whether
such overlaps still exist in the original 32-dimensional space,
we compute, for each party, the proportion of candidates
of this party who are closer to the median answer of the
candidates of at least one other party, than to the median of
their own party. These proportions are shown in Figure 5. It
appears that several of the main parties have a large propor-
tion of their candidates who are closer to at least one other
party. This concerns more than 20% of the candidates of
four of the seven parties. The FDP, CVP and BDP show
exceptionally large figures; more than 35% of FDP, 45% of
CVP and 50% of BDP candidates are closer to the median
Voters
1st
23%
2nd 8%
3rd
5%
remaining
64%
Candidates
1st
43%
2nd
9%
3rd
6%
remaining
42%
Parliament
1st
48%
2nd
14%
3rd
4%
remaining
34%
Figure 4: Proportion of the variance captured by the first three singular vectors of candidates, voters, and
parliament members. Votes at the parliament are more polarized than the opinions given on smartvote. In
turn, the opinions given by the candidates are more polarized than the opinions given by the voters.
Figure 5: Proportions of candidates of each party
that are closer to the median of at least one other
party than to the median of their own party.
Figure 6: Inter-party overlaps. The number in row i
and column j indicates the percentage of candidates
of party i that are closer to the median position of
party j.
answer of at least one other party. These parties do not
belong to political extremities, but rather share a region
near the center of the political space, which partly explains
why they largely overlap. In practice, this means that using
smartvote questions, it is hard to determine which party
suits best a person with centrist opinions.
In order to gain more insights into which parties are actu-
ally closer, we look at detailed pairwise overlaps. Specifically,
for each pair of parties (i, j), we show in Figure 6 the pro-
portion of candidates of party i who are closer to the median
of party j than to the median of their own party i. Note
that here too, these proportions are computed in the orig-
inal space, and are thus not subject to distortion due to
dimensionality reduction. It is surprising that even opposite
parties (such as SVP and SP, or SVP and Greens) have a
few overlapping candidates.
4. MUNICIPALITIES
In this section, we take a closer look at the voting patterns
of municipalities, with respect to both their main language
and their geographical location. Then, we compare the
outcome of votes in municipalities with the outcome at the
federal (national) level, and show that it is possible to identify
unique municipalities that have a great predictive power.
Throughout this section, we use the dataset of votes at the
municipality level, described in Section 2.2. It contains the
results of federal votes in Swiss municipalities, as well as the
result at the federal level (whether the object was accepted or
not). We denote by M the M×V matrix containing, for each
municipality m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and federal vote v ∈ {1, . . . , V },
the proportion Mmv of yes obtained in the municipality for
this vote. Finally, we write o = {ov, v = 1, . . . , V } for
the outcome of these votes at the federal level. We have
M = 2, 389 municipalities and V = 245 votes.
4.1 The Infamous “Röstigraben”
Following the dimensionality reduction procedure described
in Section 3.1, we project each line of M, corresponding to
the results of all votes in each municipality, onto the first
two singular vectors of M, and show the result in Figure 8.
In this figure, each municipality is represented by a point
whose shape indicates the language spoken by the majority.
The figure shows two clear clusters, corresponding to the
French-speaking municipalities on one side, and the remain-
ing municipalities on the other, separated by what Swiss
people humorously call the Ro¨stigraben7 (literally hashbrown
curtain). The gap between the two clusters reflects the dif-
ference in votes that often arise during federal elections in
7This term describes the cultural difference between the
German-speaking Switzerland, on one side, and the French-
speaking part (sometimes together with the Italian-speaking
part) on the other.
Switzerland, where the results from French-speaking cantons
are different from those of German-speaking cantons. It is
interesting to note that while the Italian-speaking municipali-
ties are culturally closer to the French-speaking ones (and are
usually placed on the same side of the Ro¨stigraben), their vot-
ing patterns seem to be closer to those of German-speaking
municipalities in this projection.
To investigate the relationship between the geographical
location of a municipality and its voting pattern, we map
each point of the two-dimensional space represented in Fig-
ure 8 to a color, illustrated by the gradient in the upper-right
corner of Figure 9. We then draw the map of Switzerland in
Figure 9, where each municipality is shown with the color
corresponding to its location in Figure 8. Thus, two munici-
palities having similar voting patterns have a similar color
on the map. Lakes and municipalities for which some vote
results are missing (e.g., due to a merging of municipalities)
are shown in white8.
Again, the separation between the French and German-
speaking parts is clearly visible. Moreover, it is possible
to identify different types of municipalities: urban centers,
such as the greater areas of Geneva, Lausanne, Bern and the
Zu¨rich area have relatively similar tints of green, indicating
that they share similar voting patterns, whereas rural areas
in the German-speaking part share a deep purple color. It
is interesting that the French-speaking part of the moun-
tainous canton of Valais, located in the southwestern part
of Switzerland, has its own unique voting pattern, shown in
light blue.
4.2 Vote Outcome Prediction
We have seen in Section 4.1 that municipalities vary sub-
stantially in their voting patterns. One question that arises
from this observation is whether it is possible to find one
municipality whose voting behavior is representative of the
global national outcomes. To answer this question, we study
in this subsection the predictability of the outcome of votes
at the federal level, using the outcome in a single municipality
as unique feature.
We therefore define the following learning problem: Given
the outcome Mmv ∈ [0, 1] of vote v in a municipality m,
can we predict its outcome ov ∈ {yes,no} at the federal
level? We split our dataset of 245 votes by taking the first
80% (196 votes) as a training set, and the remaining 20%
(49 votes) as a test set. We train one binary classifier9 for
each municipality m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. The parameters of the
classifiers are selected using a 10-fold cross-validation on the
training set. Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution
function of the accuracy of these M classifiers, averaged over
the 10 validation sets (i.e., over the 10 cross-validation folds).
The results are quite surprising: about 10% of municipali-
ties correspond to an accuracy higher than 90%, which means
that knowing their results allows us to predict the outcome
at the federal level with less than 10% of mistakes. Moreover,
some municipalities reach accuracies of more than 96% on
the validation set. The municipality reaching the highest
average prediction accuracy on the validation sets is Ebikon,
a town of 12,000 inhabitants in the canton of Lucerne. We
evaluated the accuracy of the predictor which uses the vote
outcome of Ebikon as feature, and we found that it obtains
8A more detailed map can be found online [2].
9We use a Gradient Boosted Decision Tree, implemented in
Python with scikit-learn [23].
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution function of the
accuracy of the prediction of the outcome of votes
at the federal level, given the outcome of a single
municipality. The accuracies are averaged over 10
cross-validation folds. 10% of municipalities allow
to predict vote results at the national level with an
accuracy higher than 90%.
a prediction accuracy of 95.9% on the test set. This means
that out of the 49 votes of our test set, only 2 are incorrectly
predicted by the classifier of Ebikon.
Although surprising10, these results can be partly explained
by the characteristics of Ebikon: located in the heart of
Switzerland, it is quite representative of the overall diversity
of the country. During the 2007 National Council elections,
it had overall demographic features similar to that of Switzer-
land, and the proportion of votes for the different parties
related relatively closely to the proportion of seats obtained.
Moreover, as pointed in Figure 8, its voting pattern falls in
the bulk of the German-speaking cluster.
Having such a representative sample would be extremely
useful to many: Polling institutes, political parties and even
news agencies would be able to target this municipality in-
stead of sampling the population at random, thus maximizing
the utility of their opinion surveys.
5. OTHER USES OF VAA’S
We showed in Section 3 that the data obtained from VAA’s
can be used to dress a fairly interesting portrait of the polit-
ical landscape of the country. In this section, we show that
an unscrupulous candidate could turn the public opinions of
her adversaries to her advantage, by crafting a specific profile
that would gather more voting recommendation than any
other candidate. Moreover, we also show how a concerned
citizen could turn these public profiles against potential
cheaters, by comparing their votes after their election with
their advertised opinion in order to spot changes of opinion.
5.1 Crafting the Ideal Opinion
As explained in Section 2.2, the smartvote VAA emits
voting recommendations to each visitor by first computing
the l2-distance between her responses and those of each
candidate, and then recommending the candidates who are
the closest. This means that the responses a candidate gives
to each question in the smartvote survey influences directly
the number of voting recommendations she gets. Hence, it
10A similar effect was observed in the USA for the presidential
elections, with the state of Ohio.
Figure 8: Projection of the vote results in each municipality onto the first two singular vectors of the
municipality votes matrix M. The shape of each point indicates the language spoken by the majority in the
municipality. A clear separation is visible between the French-speaking municipalities and the remaining
municipalities.
Figure 9: Voting patterns of Swiss municipalities. The color of a municipality is assigned using its location in
Figure 8 and the color gradient shown in the upper right corner. Two municipalities with similar colors have
similar voting patterns. The Ro¨stigraben, corresponding to the cultural difference between French-speaking
municipalities and German-speaking ones, is clearly visible from the difference in voting patterns. Regions
shown in white are lakes or municipalities for which some vote results are missing (due to a merging of
municipalities, for example). A more detailed map can be found online [2].
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Figure 10: Zoom in the 2-D representation of can-
didates shown in Figure 1. We clearly see an area
with no candidates, which we choose for the location
of our crafted opinion, represented as a star.
is interesting to see if it is possible to create an “optimized”
profile, in order to get as many recommendations as possible.
Computing the optimal set of answers that maximize the
likelihood of a candidate to appear on top of recommenda-
tions would require to know both the answers of candidates
and voters. However, at the time of completing the survey,
a candidate can only access the answers given by her fellow
candidates (which are publicly listed on the website). Fur-
thermore, even if the set of answers given by voters were
known in advance, the computation of an optimal profile is
of combinatorial complexity; if there are n questions with k
possible choices, an exhaustive search requires O(kn) compu-
tations. More efficient techniques (e.g., based on geometric
approximation [16]) could be used to solve this problem. We
leave a more formal study of this optimization problem for
future work.
Instead, we propose a simple but efficient heuristic to craft
a new candidate profile, by looking only at the answers of
the other candidates. Our method consists in inspecting the
distribution of candidates in the two-dimensional ideological
space depicted in Figure 1. We see that there are several
spots where the density of candidates is quite low. However,
from Figure 2, we know that voters tend to have a more
uniform distribution, thus suggesting that these spots might
correspond to “unrepresented” citizens. Thus, we choose to
place our crafted candidate in one of those spots, filling a gap
in the ideological space but staying far from the extremes.
Such an “optimal” positioning problem has been studied
from a game-theoretical point of view in simpler settings [10,
22], and it has been shown that choosing the median position
leads to the best results. However, selecting the median
answer to each question as our crafted profile did not give
satisfactory results in this setting.
To compute the actual responses this crafted candidate
should give to the smartvote survey, we proceed as follows:
First, we get the coordinates of an empty spot in the ideo-
logical space, represented in Figure 1, that is still close to
the center of the space. The intuition behind this choice is
that we want to be as far as possible from any other can-
didate, and still be close to the majority of voters. Such a
location is illustrated in Figure 10. Then, we perform the in-
verse operation of the projection explained in Section 3.1, to
project a 2-dimensional point back onto the 32-dimensional
Figure 11: Number of appearances of candidates in
the top recommendations. The curves show how
many times the median, best, and crafted candidates
appear in the top R recommendations for voters.
The crafted candidate uses responses corresponding
to the star shown in Figure 10. It gets more recom-
mendations than any other candidates, appearing in
the top 50 recommendations for close to half of the
230,000 voters.
space of smartvote responses. Because the responses can only
take values in A, we round each component of the resulting
projected answer to the closest value.
Finally, we add this crafted set of responses (obtained
from the point shown in Figure 10) to the list of candidates
and compute recommendations for each voter. We count,
for each candidate, the number of times she appears in the
top R recommendations of a voter, for R ∈ {1, . . . , 50} and
show the results in Figure 11. The lower curve shows how
many times the median candidate appears in the top R
recommendations, and the error bars indicate the standard
deviation. The middle curve shows the maximum number of
times a real candidate appears in the top R recommendations.
The upper curve shows how many times our crafted profile
appears in the top R recommendations.
We see that our crafted profile appears significantly more
often in the top recommendations than any other candidate.
For example, it appears more than 100,000 times in the top
50 recommendations, about twice as much as the best real
candidate. As our dataset consists of around 230,000 voters,
this means that our crafted profile is recommended to almost
half of the voters. Although the effect of these recommenda-
tions on direct votes has not been clearly determined [34],
Ladner et al. indicate that 67% of smartvote users state
that smartvote had an influence on their choice of party [18].
This influence is even more significant for swing voters [19].
Thus, both parties and individual candidates would benefit
from an increased number of recommendations.
5.2 Detecting Opinion Shifts
We showed above how an unscrupulous candidate could
craft a profile that would gather more recommendations than
any other. This could result in the election of this candidate,
who would then have to vote daily in the parliament. How-
ever, in this case, the votes she would cast in the parliament
may not be in accordance with the opinion expressed by her
crafted smartvote responses. As all votes of the members
of the parliament are publicly disclosed, a concerned citizen
could monitor legislators in order to detect flip-floppers, i.e.,
candidates changing their opinion after they are elected. We
Figure 12: Cumulative distribution function of the
predictability of parliament votes from smartvote re-
sponses. For each issue in the parliament dataset, we
use the smartvote profile of candidates to predict
their votes, and report the average accuracy over
10 folds, where 90% of the candidates are used for
training and 10% for evaluation. We see that close
to 50% of votes can be predicted with an accuracy
of 95% or more, using only the smartvote profiles of
legislators.
propose here a method to measure the shift in opinion of
candidates, between the profile they advertised on smartvote
(or any other VAA) during an electoral campaign, and their
voting patterns in the parliament once they are elected. Note
that our method aims only at quantifying opinion shifts.
Of course, there are many contexts where politicians can
be reasonably expected to change opinions with time, and
moderate opinions shifts need not always be interpreted as
bad signals.
5.2.1 Predicting Parliament Votes
The first step towards detecting changes of opinion is to
map a set of smartvote responses to votes in the parliament.
To do so, we identify parliament votes that can be predicted
by smartvote responses. Indeed, the intuition is that, as
smartvote responses are a good indicator of a candidate’s
political opinion, some votes can be accurately predicted
from a set of smartvote responses. Therefore, we define the
following learning problem: Given the smartvote profile of all
candidates C and their votes v at the parliament on a given
issue, learn a model that predicts the vote vc ∈ {yes, no} of
a candidate c ∈ {1, . . . , C} on this issue, from her smartvote
opinion Cc·.
We train a linear classifier11 for each of the 2,494 votes in
the parliament dataset. For each vote, we filter candidates to
keep those that actually voted (some are sometimes absent, or
abstain) as learning samples. We evaluate the predictability
of each vote by computing the prediction accuracy of our
linear classifier using on 10 folds, where, for each fold, the
classifier is trained on 90% of the candidates and evaluated on
the remaining 10%. We then compute the average accuracy
on these 10 folds, and report the results in Figure 12.
Figure 12 shows the cumulative distribution function of
the prediction accuracy for each vote. We observe that the
vast majority of votes at the parliament can be predicted
with a high accuracy from smartvote profiles; more than
11We use Logistic Regression, implemented in Python with
scikit-learn [23].
Figure 13: Opinion shifts of parliament members.
Each segment represents a legislator, and goes from
her expected votes (according to her smartvote pro-
file) to her actual votes. The median legislator has
only 0.3% of votes that are different than what is
expected from her advertised opinion. The largest
difference is 3.75%. Interestingly, the magnitudes
of the shifts seem to be different for the three coali-
tions.
90% of votes can be predicted with an accuracy higher than
85%, and close to 50% of the votes can be predicted with an
accuracy higher than 95%.
5.2.2 Computing Opinion Shifts
Now that we have a way to map smartvote opinions to
parliament votes, we can compute the expected votes of
legislators, based on their smartvote profile, and compare
them with their actual votes. To do so, we first choose
the 1,000 most predictable votes, in order to maximize the
confidence in our predicted votes. This corresponds to the
top 40% of votes, meaning that each of them can be predicted
with an accuracy higher than about 96% (see Figure 12).
We then use the predictors trained in Section 5.2.1 to
predict the expected votes of each candidate on these 1,000
issues. This means that, for each candidate, we use her
smartvote profile to compute her expected votes on these
issues, and we compare them with her actual votes. We
compute the proportion of actual votes that differ from the
expected votes. This proportion corresponds to the shift in
opinion of the candidate, between her smartvote profile and
her actual voting behavior in the parliament.
The 181 legislators voted on a median number of 906
issues. The median discrepancy between the votes predicted
from smartvote profiles and the actual votes is only 0.3%.
This means that the median candidate votes coherently with
her advertised smartvote opinion 99.7% of the time. The
candidate with the largest discrepancy has 3.75% of her votes
in opposition to her advertised opinion. While this distance
is an order of magnitude larger than the median distance, it
still means that 96 votes out of 100 are coherent with what
she advertised, which is a somewhat reassuring observation.
A larger distance could mean that she falsely advertised
her opinion on smartvote, or that she “flip-flopped”, i.e.,
she changed her opinion significantly after being elected.
However, it can also be expected that legislators sometimes
divert from their advertised positions, for example to follow
their party on a specific issue. Thus, one should be careful
when interpreting such differences between expected and
actual votes.
To visualize these opinion shifts, we show in Figure 13
the 2-D representation12 of the expected and actual votes
of each councilor, computed as explained in Section 3.1.
Each candidate is represented as a segment, with one end
corresponding to her expected votes, and the other to her
actual votes. The longer a segment, the more significant the
shift in opinion between her smartvote profile and her votes
in the parliament. Interestingly, the magnitudes of the shifts
seem to be different for the three coalitions.
6. RELATEDWORK
Spatial approaches are often used to represent politicians
or parties, most often using one or two dimensions. Some
papers use dimensionality reduction techniques similar to
ours [13, 31, 35]. However, to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to apply it on datasets of this scale. Furthermore,
we show how it can be used to craft ideal VAA profiles, and
put it in contrast with parliamentary and municipal votes.
Some researchers studied roll calls at the U.S. Congress
[26, 25, 9]. For instance, Poole et al. study voting patterns
at the Congress [26], and find that legislators can be de-
scribed in a space of low dimensionality. Based on spatial
voting theory [11], Enelow et al. propose a method to pre-
dict congressional votes. Their method relies only on past
congressional votes to make predictions. While we study
the predictability of votes, we do not use our predictors to
predict future votes. Instead, we propose a method that
permits to map one space (the opinions expressed on a VAA)
onto another (the votes in the parliament), in order quantify
opinion shifts.
Hansen et al. [15] explore the cohesiveness of political
parties using VAA data, by measuring the agreement among
party members. We propose a different approach, which
allows us to measure the overlap between each pair of parties.
While we focus on predicting the results of national issue
voting in Section 4.2, there is a large body of work that focuses
on predicting the results of elections. For instance, Armstrong
et al. [8] use biographical information about candidates to
predict U.S. election results. In addition, several studies
focus on Twitter data to predict the outcome of elections,
from Germany [33] to the Netherlands [27] and Singapore [29].
However, some researchers (see e.g., Gayo [12]) have warned
against relying only on tweets to predict election results,
arguing that the data is inherently biased and that missing
signals could be more important than observed ones.
Related to the votes prediction and the opinion shifts mea-
surement that we propose in Section 5, Gerrish et al. [14]
study the prediction of lawmakers’ position on a bill, using
the text of the bill. The authors use the resulting model
to explore how lawmakers deviate from their expected vot-
ing patterns. Finally, Poole studies members of the U.S.
Congress [24], and finds that they “adopt a consistent ideo-
logical position and maintain it over time”.
12We restrict the parliament dataset to the 1,000 most pre-
dictable votes, instead of all 2,494 votes, resulting in a pro-
jection slightly different than that shown in Figure 3.
7. CONCLUSION
We proposed a data-mining approach towards using mas-
sive open government and VAA datasets to study different
aspects of a country’s politics. We considered the case of
Switzerland, as this country has a strong democratic cul-
ture with a diversified political landscape. We observed that
the scale of the data enables statistical approaches to un-
cover patterns that usually require manual investigations by
domain experts.
We compared the polarization of voters with that of politi-
cians, before and after the elections. We found out that
some parties have more than 40% of their candidates that
are closer to at least one other party. We showed that it is
possible to learn models that predict vote outcomes at the
national level with an accuracy higher than 95%, by looking
at the outcome in a single municipality.
We described how an unscrupulous candidate could craft a
synthetic VAA profile, in order to gather a very large number
of voting recommendations. However, we also proposed a
technique to hold a legislator accountable for her opinions
expressed on a VAA, by mapping VAA responses to votes in
the parliament and comparing her expected vote with her
actual votes. Our technique can be used to spot legislators
that vote in contradiction to the opinions that they expressed
on a VAA.
Overall, our work applies to any country where similar
data is available, and it points to some avenues created by
open government initiatives that enable new data-mining
approaches to political and social sciences.
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